EXPRESS:Spatial Organisation in the Human Mind as a Function of the Distance Between Stimuli.

Studies investigating serial order in working memory have shown that participants from Western cultures are faster at responding to items presented at the beginning of a sequence using their left hand and faster at responding to items at the end with their right hand. This is known as the spatial positional association of response codes (SPoARC) effect. The SPoARC effect provides evidence that recently presented information is spatially organised in the cognitive system along a horizontal axis. This study investigated the flexibility of spatialisation by testing the effect that distance between items presented on a screen has on the magnitude of the SPoARC effect. It was hypothesised that by increasing the distance between items on a screen a larger SPoARC effect would be found. We used three conditions: central, narrow, and wide. In central, four random letters were presented sequentially at the centre of the screen, in narrow the letters were presented from left to right on the screen, wide was the same as narrow but the separation between the letters was larger. Participants consisted of 64 adults aged 18-55 years old. Participants were presented with four random letters, followed by single probe letter, participants had to indicate, by pressing a key on a normal keyboard, if the probe had been in the sequence. We analysed the data with multilevel modelling. We found evidence for the SPoARC effect in all three conditions. But no evidence that the effect varied between conditions.

Explaining the SPoARC and SNARC effects with knowledge structures: An expertise account.

Two proposals have been put forward to account conjointly for the spatial-numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect and the spatial-positional association of response codes (SPoARC) effect: the working memory account and the dual account. Here, on the basis of experimental and theoretical knowledge acquired in the field of expert memory, we propose an alternative account-named the expertise account-that explains both effects through the acquisition and use of knowledge structures (a generalization of "chunks," "retrieval structures," and "templates"), which have been used extensively in expert memory theory. These knowledge structures can be of two types: nonslotted or slotted schemas. We suggest that the SNARC effect can be explained via the use of nonslotted schemas, and the SPoARC effect via slotted schemas. We conclude our article by presenting the broader implications of our framework for working memory in general, when considering knowledge structures.

The Assessment of Emotional Reactivity Across Negative and Positive Emotions: Development and Validation of the Perth Emotional Reactivity Scale (PERS).

The Perth Emotional Reactivity Scale (PERS) is a newly developed 30-item self-report measure of emotional reactivity (affective style). The PERS measures the typical ease of activation, intensity, and duration of one's emotional responses, and importantly does so for negative and positive emotions separately. We examined the psychometric properties of the PERS in an adult community sample (N = 183). Confirmatory and exploratory factor analyses supported the capacity of the PERS to measure separate negative and positive reactivity factors, and to distinguish between the activation, intensity, and duration aspects of reactivity. All items of the PERS had strong loadings on their intended factor. Concurrent validity was supported via congruent correlations with other emotion measures, and internal reliability was good to excellent for all PERS scales and subscales. Overall, the PERS appears to have good psychometric properties, and thus has promising utility for research and clinical settings.

Assessing Emotional Reactivity: Psychometric Properties of the Perth Emotional Reactivity Scale and the Development of a Short Form.

The Perth Emotional Reactivity Scale (PERS) is a 30-item self-report measure of trait levels of emotional reactivity. In this article, we examine the psychometric properties of the PERS subscale and composite scores in an adult community sample (N = 428), and develop an 18-item short form of the measure (PERS-S). The PERS and PERS-S are designed to assess the typical ease of activation, intensity, and duration of one's emotional responses, and do so for positive and negative emotions separately. Our confirmatory factor analyses supported that the PERS and PERS-S both had the same theoretically congruent factor structure, and that all subscale and composite scores displayed high internal consistency reliability. Correlations with scores from established measures of psychopathology and emotion regulation also supported the validity of PERS and PERS-S scores. Our data therefore suggest that the PERS-S subscale and composite scores retain the psychometric strengths of their longer PERS counterparts. We conclude that both forms of the measure have good utility. Clinical and research applications are discussed.

Three Strategies for the Critical Use of Statistical Methods in Psychological Research.

We present three strategies to replace the null hypothesis statistical significance testing approach in psychological research: (1) visual representation of cognitive processes and predictions, (2) visual representation of data distributions and choice of the appropriate distribution for analysis, and (3) model comparison. The three strategies have been proposed earlier, so we do not claim originality. Here we propose to combine the three strategies and use them not only as analytical and reporting tools but also to guide the design of research. The first strategy involves a visual representation of the cognitive processes involved in solving the task at hand in the form of a theory or model together with a representation of a pattern of predictions for each condition. The second approach is the GAMLSS approach, which consists of providing a visual representation of distributions to fit the data, and choosing the best distribution that fits the raw data for further analyses. The third strategy is the model comparison approach, which compares the model of the researcher with alternative models. We present a worked example in the field of reasoning, in which we follow the three strategies.

Becoming an expert: Ontogeny of expertise as an example of neural reuse.

In this commentary, we discuss an important pattern of results in the literature on the neural basis of expertise: (a) decrease of cerebral activation at the beginning of acquisition of expertise and (b) functional cerebral reorganization as a consequence of years of practice. We show how these two results can be integrated with the neural reuse framework.

Does the cognitive reflection test measure cognitive reflection? A mathematical modeling approach.

We used a mathematical modeling approach, based on a sample of 2,019 participants, to better understand what the cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick In Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 25-42, 2005) measures. This test, which is typically completed in less than 10 min, contains three problems and aims to measure the ability or disposition to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind. However, since the test contains three mathematically based problems, it is possible that the test only measures mathematical abilities, and not cognitive reflection. We found that the models that included an inhibition parameter (i.e., the probability of inhibiting an intuitive response), as well as a mathematical parameter (i.e., the probability of using an adequate mathematical procedure), fitted the data better than a model that only included a mathematical parameter. We also found that the inhibition parameter in males is best explained by both rational thinking ability and the disposition toward actively open-minded thinking, whereas in females this parameter was better explained by rational thinking only. With these findings, this study contributes to the understanding of the processes involved in solving the CRT, and will be particularly useful for researchers who are considering using this test in their research.

Expertise modulates the neural basis of context dependent recognition of objects and their relations.

Recognition of objects and their relations is necessary for orienting in real life. We examined cognitive processes related to recognition of objects, their relations, and the patterns they form by using the game of chess. Chess enables us to compare experts with novices and thus gain insight in the nature of development of recognition skills. Eye movement recordings showed that experts were generally faster than novices on a task that required enumeration of relations between chess objects because their extensive knowledge enabled them to immediately focus on the objects of interest. The advantage was less pronounced on random positions where the location of chess objects, and thus typical relations between them, was randomized. Neuroimaging data related experts' superior performance to the areas along the dorsal stream-bilateral posterior temporal areas and left inferior parietal lobe were related to recognition of object and their functions. The bilateral collateral sulci, together with bilateral retrosplenial cortex, were also more sensitive to normal than random positions among experts indicating their involvement in pattern recognition. The pattern of activations suggests experts engage the same regions as novices, but also that they employ novel additional regions. Expert processing, as the final stage of development, is qualitatively different than novice processing, which can be viewed as the starting stage. Since we are all experts in real life and dealing with meaningful stimuli in typical contexts, our results underline the importance of expert-like cognitive processing on generalization of laboratory results to everyday life.

Expertise in complex decision making: the role of search in chess 70 years after de Groot.

One of the most influential studies in all expertise research is de Groot's (1946) study of chess players, which suggested that pattern recognition, rather than search, was the key determinant of expertise. Many changes have occurred in the chess world since de Groot's study, leading some authors to argue that the cognitive mechanisms underlying expertise have also changed. We decided to replicate de Groot's study to empirically test these claims and to examine whether the trends in the data have changed over time. Six Grandmasters, five International Masters, six Experts, and five Class A players completed the think-aloud procedure for two chess positions. Findings indicate that Grandmasters and International Masters search more quickly than Experts and Class A players, and that both groups today search substantially faster than players in previous studies. The findings, however, support de Groot's overall conclusions and are consistent with predictions made by pattern recognition models.

Left lateralization in autobiographical memory: an fMRI study using the expert archival paradigm.

In brain-imaging and behavioral research, studies of autobiographical memory have higher ecological validity than controlled laboratory memory studies. However, they also have less controllability over the variables investigated. This article presents a novel technique - the expert archival paradigm - that increases controllability while maintaining ecological validity. Stimuli were created from games played by two international-level chess masters. The two players were asked to perform a memory task with stimuli generated from their own games and stimuli generated from other players' games while they were scanned using fMRI. The study found a left lateralized pattern of brain activity that was very similar in both masters. The brain areas activated were the left temporo-parietal junction and left frontal areas. The expert archival paradigm has the advantage of not requiring an interview to assess the participants' autobiographical memories, and affords the possibility of measuring their accuracy of remembering as well as their brain activity related to remote and recent memories. It can also be used in any field of expertise, including arts, sciences, and sports, in which archival data are available.

Brain localization of memory chunks in chessplayers.

Chess experts store domain-specific representations in their long-term memory; due to the activation of such representations, they perform with high accuracy in tasks that require the maintenance of previously seen information. Chunk-based theories of expertise (chunking theory: Chase & Simon, 1973; template theory: Gobet & Simon, 1996) state that expertise is acquired mainly by the acquisition and storage in long-term memory of familiar chunks that allow quick recognition. This study tested some predictions of these theories by using fMRI while chessplayers performed a recognition memory task. These theories predict that chessplayers access long-term memory chunks of domain-specific information, which are presumably stored in the temporal lobes. It was also predicted that the recognition memory tasks would activate working memory areas in the frontal and parietal lobes. These predictions were supported by the data.

The role of domain-specific practice, handedness, and starting age in chess.

The respective roles of the environment and innate talent have been a recurrent question for research into expertise. The authors investigated markers of talent, environment, and critical period for the acquisition of expert performance in chess. Argentinian chess players (N = 104), ranging from weak amateurs to grandmasters, completed a questionnaire measuring variables including individual and group practice, starting age, and handedness. The study reaffirms the importance of practice for reaching high levels of performance, but it also indicates a large variability: The slower player needed 8 times as much practice to reach master level than the faster player. Additional results show a correlation between skill and starting age and indicate that players are more likely to be mixed-handed than individuals in the general population; however, there was no correlation between handedness and skill within the sample of chess players. Together, these results suggest that practice is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the acquisition of expertise, that some additional factors may differentiate chessplayers and nonchessplayers, and that starting age of practice is important.

Structure and stimulus familiarity: a study of memory in chess-players with functional magnetic resonance imaging.

A grandmaster and an international chess master were compared with a group of novices in a memory task with chess and non-chess stimuli, varying the structure and familiarity of the stimuli, while functional magnetic resonance images were acquired. The pattern of brain activity in the masters was different from that of the novices. Masters showed no differences in brain activity when different degrees of structure and familiarity where compared; however, novices did show differences in brain activity in such contrasts. The most important differences were found in the contrast of stimulus familiarity with chess positions. In this contrast, there was an extended brain activity in bilateral frontal areas such as the anterior cingulate and the superior, middle, and inferior frontal gyri; furthermore, posterior areas, such as posterior cingulate and cerebellum, showed great bilateral activation. These results strengthen the hypothesis that when performing a domain-specific task, experts activate different brain systems from that of novices. The use of the experts-versus-novices paradigm in brain imaging contributes towards the search for brain systems involved in cognitive processes.

Structure and stimulus familiarity: a study of memory in chess-players with functional magnetic resonance imaging

A grandmaster and an international chess master were compared with a group of novices in a memory task with chess and non-chess stimuli, varying the structure and familiarity of the stimuli, while functional magnetic resonance images were acquired. The pattern of brain activity in the masters was different from that of the novices. Masters showed no differences in brain activity when different degrees of structure and familiarity where compared; however, novices did show differences in brain activity in such contrasts. The most important differences were found in the contrast of stimulus familiarity with chess positions. In this contrast, there was an extended brain activity in bilateral frontal areas such as the anterior cingulate and the superior, middle, and inferior frontal gyri; furthermore, posterior areas, such as posterior cingulate and cerebellum, showed great bilateral activation.These results strengthen the hypothesis that when performing a domain-specific task, experts activate different brain systems from that of novices. The use of the experts versus-novices paradigm in brain imaging contributes towards the search for brain systems involved in cognitive processes (AU)

Un gran maestro y un maestro internacional de ajedrez se compararon con un grupo de aficionados en una tarea de memoria con estímulos ajedrecísticos y no ajedrecísticos, variando la estructura y familiaridad de los estímulos, mientras se tomaron imágenes cerebrales usando resonancia magnética funcional. El patrón de activación cerebral difirió entre los maestros y los aficionados. Los maestros no presentaron ninguna diferencia en activación cerebral cuando se compararon distintos niveles de familiaridad y estructura de los estímulos; en cambio, los aficionados presentaron diferencias en activación cerebral en dichas comparaciones. Las diferencias más considerables se encontraron en el contraste de familiaridad del estímulo en posiciones de ajedrez. En ese contraste hubo una extensa actividad cerebral bilateral en regiones frontales como la corteza cingulada anterior y los giros frontales superior, medio e inferior; asimismo, áreas posteriores como la corteza cingulada posterior y el cerebelo también mostraron gran activación bilateral. Estos resultados fortalecen la hipótesis de que cuando los expertos realizan tareas específicas de dominio activan sistemas cerebrales diferentes a los que usan los aficionados ejecutando la misma tarea. El uso del paradigma expertos-versus- novatos en imaginería cerebral contribuye a la búsqueda de sistemas cerebrales involucrados en procesos cognoscitivos (AU)